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This paper takes stock of recent research dealing with the degree to which the trilemma 
choices of Asian countries facilitated a smoother adjustment during the global crisis of 2008–
2009, and the way the region has been coping with the adjustment to the postcrisis 
challenges. We point out that emerging Asia has converged to a middle ground of the 
trilemma configuration: limited financial integration, a degree of monetary independence, and 
controlled exchange rate buffered by sizable international reserves. This configuration, with 
the proper management of balance sheet exposure and public finances, facilitated a 
smoother adjustment of emerging Asia to the crisis, and was instrumental in inducing the 
rapid resumption of growth. The swings of financial flows, from large deleveraging of foreign 
positions in 2008 to the renewed inflows in 2010, validate the insight of the public finance 
approach to financial integration: the gains from deeper financial integration should be 
balanced against the costs of growing exposure to turbulences. A key lesson of the crisis is 
the need to apply a comprehensive cost/benefit approach to prudential policies, to the 
regulation of external borrowing and of domestic financial intermediation, and to the 
accumulation and use of international reserves. We illustrate these results in the context of 
the challenges facing emerging Asia’s adjustment during the global financial crisis, and the 
postcrisis policy stance dealing with the renewed inflows of capital.  
 






1.  Introduction and Overview  ........................................................................................... 1 
2.  The Policy Trilemma and Financial Stability  ................................................................ 1 
2.1  From the trilemma to the quadrilemma? ........................................................... 6 
2.2  Trilemma configuration in Asia, the crisis of 2008–2009 and the postcrisis era 8 
2.3  The trilemma choices and Asia’s adjustment during the crisis .......................... 9 
3.  The Crisis of 2008–2009 ........................................................................................... 10 
4.  Policy Lessons .......................................................................................................... 13 
4.1  Postcrisis challenges ....................................................................................... 18 
5.  Concluding Remarks ................................................................................................. 19 
References and Further Readings ........................................................................................ 21 
 ADBI Working Paper 317    Aizenman 
1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  AND  OVERVIEW   
This paper provides an overview of the patterns of financial stability in Asia during the 2000s, 
and studies the possible lessons of the global crisis of 2008–2009. We start by portraying 
the varying patterns of emerging Asia in the extended trilemma framework, where countries 
choose the degree of financial openness, exchange rate stability, and monetary 
independence, buffered by the accumulation of international reserves. We show that the 
trend has been a convergence to the middle ground of the trilemma configuration, with a 
sizable accumulation of international reserves. This configuration, with the proper 
management of countries’ balance sheet exposure and public finances, reduced the 
adjustment costs of emerging Asia to the global crisis of 2008–2009, and facilitated the 
remarkable resumption of Asian growth in 2010. We also review the challenges associated 
with the wide swings of financial flows to emerging countries during the 2000s: the sizeable 
net inflows before the crisis of 2008–2009, the large deleveraging of foreign positions during 
the crisis, and the resumption of large inflows in the aftermath of the crisis. We summarize 
the recent trends, and study the desirable future policy stance of emerging market countries. 
The crisis of 2008–2009 validates the insight of the public finance approach to financial 
integration: gains from deeper financial integration should be balanced against the costs of a 
growing exposure to turbulences. Furthermore, policymakers should manage and balance 
possible misalignments between the financial and real sectors. A key lesson of the crisis is 
the need to apply a comprehensive cost-benefit approach to prudential policies, to the 
regulation of external borrowing and of domestic financial intermediation, and to the 
accumulation and use of international reserves. We illustrate these considerations by 
reviewing the use of international reserves and of exchange rate policies during the crisis; 
and the policy stance towards the renewed inflows of capital in the aftermath of the crisis. 
We argue that significant drivers of the flows of capital are yield chasing and carry trade, 
where the interests of the financial system may diverge from the interests of taxpayers, 
requiring proper prudential regulation to reduce the taxpayers’ exposure to future crises.    
2.  THE POLICY TRILEMMA AND FINANCIAL STABILITY 
The policy trilemma (the ability to accomplish only two out of three policy objectives—
financial integration, exchange rate stability, and monetary autonomy) is a key implication of 
the Mundell-Fleming macroeconomic framework. A lingering challenge of taking the trilemma 
framework to the data is that, in practice, most countries rarely face the binary choices 
articulated by the trilemma. Instead, countries decide the degrees of financial integration, 
exchange rate flexibility, and monetary autonomy. Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito (2010, 2011) 
dealt with this issue by constructing three continuous indexes measuring the de facto 
trilemma dimensions of each country, normalizing each index between zero and one. The 
three trilemma indexes cover more than 170 economies for 1970 through 2009. The 
monetary independence index (MI) is based on the correlation of a country’s interest rates 
with the base country’s interest rate. The index for exchange rate stability depends 
negatively on exchange rate volatility, using the exchange rate between the home and base 
economies. The degree of financial integration is measured with the Chinn and Ito (2008) 
capital controls index (KAOPEN).
1  
                                                  
1  The index for monetary independence (MI) equals 10 . 5 [ ( ,)( 1 ) ] ij corr i i − −−
, where i refers to home 
countries and j to the base country. By construction, higher values of the index mean higher monetary policy 
independence.  




Figure 1 shows the trajectories of the trilemma indexes for different income-country groups. 
For the industrialized economies, deepening financial openness accelerated after the 
beginning of the 1990s while the extent of monetary independence started a declining trend. 
After the end of the 1990s, exchange rate stability rose significantly, reflecting the 
introduction of the euro in 1999.
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(( l o g ( _ ) ) stdev exch rate Δ is the annual standard deviations of monthly exchange rate series between the 
home country and the base country.  
Financial openness (KAOPEN) equals the de jure index of capital account openness constructed by Chinn and 
Ito (2008), normalized between zero and one. Higher values of this index indicate that a country is more open 
to cross-border capital transactions.  
The indexes are available at http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/trilemma_indexes.htm .  
2 If the euro economies are removed from the sample, financial openness evolves similarly to the IDC group that 
includes the euro economies, but exchange rate stability hovers around the line for monetary independence, 
though at bit higher levels, after the early 1990s. The difference between exchange rate stability and monetary 
independence has been slightly diverging after the end of the 1990s. ADBI Working Paper 316      Aizenman 
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Figure 1: Development of the Trilemma Configurations over Time
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Developing economies on the other hand do not present such a distinct divergence of the 
indexes, and their experiences differ depending on whether they are emerging or non-
emerging market economies.
4  For emerging market economies, exchange rate stability 
declined rapidly from the 1970s through the mid-1980s. After some retrenchment around 
early 1980s (in the wake of the debt crisis), financial openness started rising from 1990 
onwards. For the other developing economies, exchange rate stability declined less rapidly, 
and financial openness trended upward more slowly. In both cases though, monetary 
independence remained more or less trendless.  
Interestingly, for the emerging market economies, the indexes suggest a convergence 
toward the middle ground, even as talk of the disappearing middle has been doing the 
rounds. This pattern suggests that developing economies may have been trying to cling to 
moderate levels of both monetary independence and financial openness, while maintaining 
higher levels of exchange rate stability. In other words, they have been leaning against the 
trilemma over a period that coincides with the time when some of these economies began 
accumulating sizable international reserves (IR), potentially to buffer the trade-off arising 
from the trilemma.  
None of these observations is applicable to non-emerging developing market economies 
(Figure 1[c]). For this group of economies, exchange rate stability has been the most 
aggressively pursued policy throughout the period. In contrast to the experience of the 
emerging market economies, financial liberalization has not been proceeding rapidly for the 
non-emerging market developing economies. Asia, especially Asian emerging market 
countries, stands out from other geographical groups of economies.
5 Panel (a) in Figure 2
6 
shows that for Asian emerging market economies, this sort of convergence is not a recent 
phenomenon. Since as early as the early 1980s, the three indexes have been clustered 
around the middle range. However, for most of the time, except for the Asian crisis years of 
1997–1998, exchange rate stability seems to have been the most pervasive policy choice. In 
the postcrisis years in the 2000s, the indexes diverged, but seem to be converging again in 
the recent years. This characterization does not appear to be applicable to non-emerging 
market economies (non-EMG) in Asia (b) or Latin America (c). For non-emerging economies 
in Asia or non-Asian developing economies, convergence in the trilemma configurations 
seems to be the case in the last decade. 
                                                  
4 The emerging market economies are defined as the economies classified as either “emerging” or “frontier” 
during 1980–97 by the International Financial Corporation. For those in Asia, emerging market economies are 
“Emerging East Asia-14” defined by Asian Development Bank plus India. 
5 The sample of “Asian Emerging Market Economies” includes Cambodia; the PRC; Hong Kong, China; India; 
Indonesia; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore; Thailand; and Viet Nam. 
6  Source: Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito 2011; Notes: Mon. Indep.=monetary independence; IDC=industrialized 
countries; Exch. R. Stability=exchange rate stability; KAOPEN=the Chinn-Ito Financial Openness Variable; 
EMG=emerging market economies; non-EMG LDC=non-emerging market developing countries ADBI Working Paper 316      Aizenman 
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Figure 2: Regional Comparison of the Development of the Trilemma Configurations  
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2.1  From the trilemma to the quadrilemma? 
An unintended consequence of the greater financial globalization adopted by most emerging 
markets during the 1990s has been their growing exposure to financial turbulences 
associated with sudden stops of inflows of capital, capital flights, and deleveraging crises. 
The significant output and social costs associated with financial crises, estimated on average 
above 10% of gross domestic product (GDP), added financial stability to the three policy 
goals framed by the original trilemma, probably changing the policy trilemma into the policy 
quadrilemma.  
Pursuing financial integration while maintaining financial stability of emerging markets may 
explain intriguing developments in the three decades since the 1980s—despite the 
proliferation of greater exchange rate flexibility, international reserves/GDP ratios increased 
substantially. Most of the increase in reserve holding has taken place in developing 
countries, especially in emerging Asia (see Figure 3). The dramatic increase of international 
reserve hoarding has been lopsided. While the international reserves/GDP ratio of industrial 
countries was overall stable, hovering below 10%, the reserves/GDP ratio of developing 
countries increased dramatically, close to tripling in 25 years. By 2007, about two thirds of 
the global international reserves were held by developing countries. Most of this increase 
has been in Asia. The most dramatic changes occurred in the People’s Republic of China 
(henceforth, PRC), increasing its reserve/GDP from below 5% in 1980, to about 50% in 
2009. Econometric evaluations suggest several structural changes in the patterns of 
reserves hoarded by developing countries. A notable change occurred in the 1990s, a 
decade when the international reserves/GDP ratios shifted upwards. This trend intensified 
shortly after the East Asian crisis of 1997–1998, which had subsided by 2000. Another 
structural change took place in early 2000s, mostly driven by an unprecedented increase in 
the hoarding of international reserves in the PRC. The PRC’s reserve/GDP ratio more than 
tripled during the 2000s. 
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A possible interpretation for the unprecedented hoarding of international reserves reported in 
Figure 3 deals with the unintended consequences of financial globalization. A remarkable 
takeoff in reserve hoarding by developing countries occurs from early 1990s, coinciding with 
the takeoff of financial integration of developing countries. The hoarding of international 
reserves/GDP by developing countries accelerated dramatically in the aftermath of the East 
Asian crisis. The evidence is consistent with the conjecture that financial integration of 
developing countries led to drastic changes in the demand for international reserves. Prior to 
the financial integration, the demand for reserves provided self-insurance against volatile 
trade flows. However, financial integration of developing countries also added the need to 
self-insure against volatile financial flows. By the nature of financial markets, the exposure to 
rapidly increasing demands for foreign currency triggered by financial volatility, exceeds by a 
wide margin the one triggered by trade volatility. The East Asian crisis was a watershed 
event, as it impacted high saving countries with overall balanced fiscal accounts. These 
countries were viewed as being less exposed to sudden stop events as compared with other 
developing countries prior to the crisis. With a lag, the affected countries reacted by massive 
increases in their stock of reserves (Aizenman and Marion 2003).  
Recent studies validate the importance of “financial factors” as key determinants, in addition 
to the traditional trade factors, in accounting for increased international reserves/GDP ratios. 
Indeed, recent research has revealed that the role of financial factors has increased in 
tandem with growing financial integration. More financially open, financially deep countries, 
with greater exchange rate stability tend to hold more reserves. Within the emerging market 
sample, the fixed exchange rate effect is weaker, but financial depth (measured by M2/GDP) 
is highly significant and growing in importance over time (Cheung and Ito 2009, Obstfeld et 
al. 2010). Trade openness is the other robust determinant of reserve demand, though its 
importance seems to have diminished over time. The growing importance of financial factors 
helps in accounting for a greater share of the international reserves/GDP ratios (Aizenman 
and Lee 2007). These results are in line with a broader self-insurance view, where reserves 
provide a buffer, both against deleveraging initiated by foreign parties, as well as against the 
sudden wish of domestic residents to acquire new external assets, i.e., “sudden capital flight” 
(Calvo 1998, 2006; Aizenman and Lee 2007). The high positive co-movement of 
international reserves and M2 is consistent with the view that the greatest capital flight risks 
are posed by the most liquid assets, i.e., by the liquid liabilities of the banking system as 
measured by M2. 
The views linking the large increase in hoarding reserves to growing exposure to sudden 
stops associated with financial integration face a well-known contender in a modern 
incarnation of mercantilism, also dubbed as the Bretton Woods II hypothesis (Dooley, 
Folkerts-Landau, and Garber 2003). According to this interpretation, reserves accumulation 
is a by-product of promoting exports, which is needed to create better jobs, thereby 
absorbing abundant labor in traditional sectors. Though intellectually intriguing, this 
interpretation remains debatable—the history of Japan and the Republic of Korea suggests 
the near absence of mercantilist hoarding of international reserves during the phase of fast 
growth, and the prevalence of export promotion by preferential financing in targeted sectors. 
Floundering economic growth led to the onset of large hoarding of reserves in Japan and the 
Republic of Korea, probably due to both mercantilist motives and self-insurance in order to 
deal with growing fragility of the banking system. These perspectives suggest that the 
massive hoarding of reserves by the PRC is a hybrid of the mercantilist and self insurance 
motives. Yet mercantilist hoarding by one country may induce competitive hoarding by other 
countries to preempt any competitive advantage gained by the first country, a reaction that 
would dissipate most competitiveness gains (Aizenman and Lee 2008). This view is 
supported by the interdependence of the demand for international reserves among East 
Asian countries (Cheung and Qian 2009). 
The link between hoarding reserves and financial integration suggests a fourth dimension to 




international reserves may increase their financial stability and capacity to run independent 
macroeconomic policies. This development seems to be important for emerging markets that 
are only partially integrated with the global financial system, and where sterilization is heavily 
used to manage the potential inflationary effects of hoarding reserves (the PRC and India 
being prime examples of these trends (Aizenman and Glick [2009]). In contrast, most of the 
industrial countries kept their international reserves/GDP ratios low. This could have 
reflected the easy access of industrial countries to bilateral swap lines in case of urgent 
needs for foreign currencies, as well as their ability to borrow externally in their currencies. 
The experience of emerging markets suggests that the trilemma triangle, while useful, 
overlooks the possibility that with limited but growing financial integration, countries hoarding 
international reserves may loosen in the short-run some of the trilemma constraints. This 
possibility may be illustrated by contrasting the trilemma trends of Latin American and Asian 
emerging markets. Latin American emerging market economies had liberalized their financial 
markets rapidly since the 1990s, after some retrenchment during the 1980s, while reducing 
the extent of monetary independence and maintaining a lower level of exchange rate stability 
in recent years. Emerging Asian economies on the other hand, stand out by achieving 
comparable levels of exchange rate stability and growing financial openness while 
consistently displaying greater monetary independence. These two groups of economies are 
most differentiated from each other by their levels of international reserves holding, much 
higher in emerging Asia than in emerging Latin American countries. Without giving up its 
exchange rate stability and monetary independence, the PRC has increased its international 
reserves holding while slowly increasing financial openness. This evidence is consistent with 
the view that countries’ efforts to “relax the trilemma” in the short-run can involve an increase 
in international reserves holding. 
2.2  Trilemma configuration in Asia, the crisis of 2008–2009 and the 
postcrisis era 
The crisis of 2008–2009 may be viewed as the first serious test of the modern era of 
globalization. The financial turbulences in the 1990s started in emerging markets, with most 
of the contagion affecting other emerging markets. In contrast, the crisis of 2008–2009 
originated in the United States, with repaid global transmission to most countries. The 
resultant transmission put most emerging markets at the receiving end of massive 
deleveraging, where the excess demand for the dollar induced liquidation pressure by 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) investors. The crisis 
validated the usefulness of the trilemma middle ground configuration in dealing with the 
challenges facing the developing countries. Emerging markets benefited by adopting 
controlled exchange rate flexibility and the active management of external balance sheet 
exposure by using reserves to cover short-term debt (see Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999 
for analysis of balance sheet exposure). While decoupling of emerging markets countries 
from the recession impacting the OECD has been illusive, emerging Asia became the key 
contributor to the postcrisis global growth, led by the largest and most populous countries—
the PRC and India. Overall, these countries adopted a heterodox approach, managing and 
controlling their financial integration. Arguably, these trends validate the public finance 
approach to financial integration: gains from deeper financial integration should be balanced 
against the costs of growing exposure to turbulences. Furthermore, policy makers should 
manage and balance possible misalignments of the interests of the financial and real 
sectors, elaborated below.  
To put this discussion into the proper perspectives, note that the gains of financial integration 
for emerging markets are not self evident, as most of their growth was self-financed. "Self-
financed growth" refers to an empirical literature which has emerged in the 2000s, which 
looks at the role played by national as opposed to foreign savings in promoting economic 




(2007), Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian (2007), and others. Together with theoretical work 
by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006), it complements earlier work which looked at the links 
between vulnerability and financial integration: the first asks whether financial integration has 
been good for growth; the second, whether it has been bad for vulnerability.  
In a recent paper, Aizenman and Sushko (2011) examine the differential impact of three 
broad types of financial capital inflows—portfolio debt, portfolio equity, and foreign direct 
investment (FDI)—on manufacturing industry growth in a large sample of countries. They 
extended Rajan and Zingales’ (1998) methodology, utilizing external finance dependence 
measure in a time-series context, in cross-sectional regressions of manufacturing industries’ 
growth rates on a set of industry and country controls across 37 manufacturing industries, in 
up to 104 countries over 1991 through 2007. They found substantial differences between the 
effects of portfolio debt, portfolio equity, and FDI inflows on industrial growth. Overall, net 
portfolio debt and equity have mixed, frequently negative effects on industry’s growth. FDI 
inflows provided more consistent gains.
7 It’s noteworthy that these studies do not imply that 
financial autarky is optimal, as rapid trade integration forces growing financial integration 
supported by tacit capital mobility via trade misinvoicing. Instead, these works suggest the 
need for a balanced cost/benefit approach towards the optimal degree of financial 
integration, as there are no reasons to expect that full financial integration is optimal in the 
presence of distortions and externalities. 
2.3  The trilemma choices and Asia’s adjustment during the crisis 
In Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito (2011) we examined econometrically how the various choices 
regarding the three policies affect final macro-policy goals, namely, high economic growth, 
output growth stability, low inflation, and inflation stability.
8 Overall, the study is consistent 
with the following conjectures: 
i.  When policymakers put greater weight on real exchange rate stability, it is better to 
pursue more nominal exchange rate stability and greater financial openness (which implies 
lower levels of monetary independence). This configuration could have a volatility-increasing 
impact on investment and output, though the ultimate effect may depend on the level of 
international reserves and reserves accumulation policy.  
ii.  Greater monetary independence increases real exchange rate volatility. If an 
emerging market country holds a level of IR/GDP above a threshold and pursues a higher 
                                                  
7 The coefficients on net portfolio debt inflows are negative and significant in late 1990s, during the run-up to the 
Asian financial crisis, and to some degree in the 2000’s. Surges in portfolio equity inflows also exhibit negative 
association with aggregate growth of the manufacturing sector. The economic magnitude of the impact of 
equity inflows are persistently negative and significant during 1999 through the 2005 period, with the actual 
inflows to various countries, including Chile, the PRC, the Republic of Korea, and Turkey, showing persistent 
negative impact on manufacturing sector growth. In contrast to debt inflows, equity inflows exhibited 
statistically and economically significant positive impact on the growth of financially constrained industries, 
unlike their negative impact on the average manufacturing growth rate. Finally, FDI inflows exhibit positive 
association with aggregate manufacturing growth during most of the sample period, and this positive economic 
impact is observed at the aggregate level and specifically for the industries in need of external financing.  
8 The data set is organized into 5-year panels, where all time-varying variables are included as 5-year averages. 
The estimation model used is given by: 
it i t it it it it it it D Z X IR TLM IR TLM y ε α α α α + Φ + Γ + Β + × + + + = ) ( 3 2 1 0 ;  yit is the measure of 
macro policy performance for country i in year t, i.e., output growth, output volatility, inflation volatility, and the 
medium-term level of inflation. TLMit is a vector of any two of the three trilemma indexes, namely, MI (monetary 
independence),  ERS (exchange rate stability), and KAOPEN (financial openness).  IRit is the level of 
international reserves holding (excluding gold) as a ratio to GDP, and (TLMit x IRit) is an interaction term 
between the trilemma indexes and the level of IR, that may allow us to observe whether IR complement or 




level of exchange rate stability and a lower level monetary independence (i.e., a combination 
of greater exchange rate stability and greater financial openness), that country could achieve 
higher levels of real exchange rate stability and investment.  
iii.  This result may explain why many emerging market economies, especially those that 
are more open to international trade such as Asian emerging market economies, tend to 
prefer exchange rate stability and holding a massive amount of IR while also pursuing 
financial liberalization.  
These finding have a significant relevance for Asian economies. The IR/GDP ratio for the 
Asian emerging market economies is the highest among the regional subgroups. Asian 
emerging market economies may have pursued international macroeconomic policies that 
help reduce the level of volatility in both investment and the real exchange rates, or at least 
the latter, if not both. Emerging Asia achieved lower levels of volatilities in both investment 
and the real exchange rate than any other group of developing economies (except for the 
1990s because of the Asian crisis), and their levels are comparable to that of industrialized 
economies.  
For the group of Asian emerging market economies, the trilemma policy combination 
contributes to lowering the volatilities of output and the real exchange rate, but possibly to 
raising the volatility of investment. However, given that these economies are quite open, the 
volatility-reducing impact of the trilemma policy combination on the real exchange rate 
volatility should outweigh the volatility-increasing impact on the investment volatility, thus 
contributing to lowering output volatility. For relatively closed economies which hold high 
levels of IR (higher than about 16% of GDP in the period we studied), policymakers may 
choose to pursue weaker monetary independence and greater exchange rate stability so 
that they can achieve higher stability in both investment and real exchange rates. However, 
in those economies which hold low levels of IR, policymakers may choose to pursue greater 
monetary independence and lower exchange rate stability although they could not minimize 
the volatility of the real exchange rate with greater monetary independence and lower 
exchange rate stability. 
Overall, the trilemma policy configuration seems to be effective in reducing the volatility of 
the real exchange rate for the Asian economies. For this group of economies, it is the trade 
channel through which the trilemma policies seem to be affecting the volatility of output.  
3.  THE CRISIS OF 2008–2009 
We analyze in this section the adjustment of emerging countries to the global crisis of 2008–
2009. The earlier hopes for decoupling emerging Asia from the recessionary stance of the 
OECD during 2008 did not happen. Yet, after the intense deleveraging pressure associated 
with the dollar shortage in the second half of 2008, market sentiments switched, and large 
inflows of capital to emerging markets, and emerging Asia in particular, resumed in 2010. 
Higher international reserves/short-term external debt act as a buffer, reducing the odds and 
the severity of sudden stops and capital flight crises. The actual patterns of reserves during 
the 2008–2009 crisis revealed a mixed and complex adjustment. About half of the emerging 
markets managed the crisis without depleting reserves. The other half of the emerging 
markets depleted at the peak of the global crisis between 10% to one third of their 
international reserves.
9 Most of them bounced back to respectful growth paths, without the 
                                                  
9 See Aizenman and Sun (2010) for further details. The absence of reserve depletion during the crisis does not 
necessarily imply that the emerging markets that refrained from using reserves were mistaken in accumulating 
the reserves in the first place. Crises come in various varieties, and these countries may benefit from using 
their reserves in the future. The absence of the use of reserves may also reflect the deterrent effect of higher 




need for massive external help. Those emerging market and developing countries that relied 
on such help (using Federal Reserve [Fed]'s swap lines [the Republic of Korea and Mexico]; 
or International Monetary Fund [IMF] stabilization packages) were characterized by large 
balance sheet exposure, where too lax financial regulations prior to the crisis increased their 
vulnerabilities. 
Looking at the patterns of using IR during the crisis, Aizenman and Sun (2010) explored the 
adjustment of 21 emerging markets countries (EMs) during the window of the crisis and 
found a mixed and complex picture. Regression analysis showed that EMs with large 
primary commodity exports, especially oil exports, experienced large IR losses during the 
2008–2009 global crisis. Countries with a medium level of financial openness and a large 
short-term external debt to GDP ratio also on average lost more of their initial IR holdings. 
Aizenman and Sun (2010) also compared the pre-crisis demand for IR/GDP of countries that 
experienced sizable depletion of their IR, to that of countries that did not, and found 
differential patterns across the two groups. Trade related factors seem to be more significant 
in accounting for the pre-crisis IR/GDP levels for countries that experienced a sizable 
depletion of IR in the first phase of the crisis. While for other countries, financial factor are 
more important, and they achieved external adjustment through large currency depreciations 
rather than sizable IR depletion.  
These findings are consistent with the view that countries that were intensively using 
reserves during the crisis had internalized their large exposure to trade shocks before the 
crisis, and used their IR as a buffer stock during the crisis. Further analysis shows that the IR 
losses of these countries followed an inverted logistical curve. After a rapid initial depletion of 
IR, they reached within seven months a markedly declining rate of IR depletion, and lost not 
more than one third of their pre crisis IR. Countries with larger external exposure tend to use 
more reserves in the first phase of the crisis. However with the increased stresses and not 
knowing the duration of the crisis, authorities started to rely more on currency depreciations 
rather than reserve depletion as a response to increasing market pressure. The patterns of 
using IR by the countries with sizable reserve depletion, and refraining from using IR by 
other countries, suggest that the adjustment of EMs during the ongoing global liquidity crisis 
was constrained more by their fear of reserves depletion than by their fear of floating (see 
Calvo and Reinhart [2002] for earlier analysis of the fear of floating).  
The experience of emerging markets suggests that at time of financial panic, international 
reserves function as a buffer funding the delivering of short-term debt. Figure 4 traces the 
average quarterly IR position and short-term external borrowing of emerging markets during 
2008, and the first quarter of 2009. The countries are grouped into EMs that suffered 
significant IR losses (Group 1), and those that experience small IR losses, or gains (Group 
2). Data constraints reduced the size of each group to 9 countries.
10 EMs that experienced 
sizable IR losses during the worst part of the crisis were exposed to a much larger 
deleveraging of short-term external debt than other EMs. During Q4 2008, the average IR 
losses were $28 billion for EMs in the sizable IR losses group, half of it funded the 
deleveraging of short-term external debt ($14 billion). In contrast, IR losses and the 
deleveraging of short-term debt were close to zero for countries experiencing small IR losses 
during Q4 2008 (IR increased on average by $1 billion, short-term external debt declined by 
$2 billion). This observation supports the notion that countries with high external debt 
exposure needed deeper use of reserves at the peak of the crisis, 2008 Q4, compared with 
those with low external debt exposure. 
                                                                                                                                                     
depreciation pressures. See De Gregorio (2011) for evidence on the role of international reserves in the 
determination of changes in Emerging Markets Bond Indexes spreads during the subprime crisis.   
10 Sizable IR loss group includes: Brazil, India, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Peru, Poland, Russia 
and Turkey.  Non-sizable IR loss group include: Argentina, Chile, the Czech Republic, Columbia, Egypt, Israel, 
Mexico, Thailand, and South Africa (quarterly data is not available for the People’s Republic of China; Peru; 




Figure 4: IR Depletion and Deleveraging during the 2008–2009 Crisis. 
 
 
Source: Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito 2011 
As during the 1997–1998 crisis, the Republic of Korea continued to be a bellwether country. 
The Republic of Korea’s financial history in the 2000s illustrates the challenges associated 
with open capital markets. During the mid 2000s, the Korean regulator’s “hands-off” attitude 
contributed to the buildup of balance sheet vulnerabilities prior to the crisis. The 
deleveraging pressure during the global crisis led to massive depreciation, and despite the 
sizable IR position prior to the crisis, the Republic of Korea faced the prospect of another 
financial meltdown.  
Figure 5 summarizes the evaluation of international reserves, short- and long-term borrowing 
of the Republic of Korea in recent decades. The experience of the financial melt down during 
1997–1998 led to the sharp increase of IR/GDP after the Asian crisis. By 2000, the Republic 
of Korea’s reserves were about twice as large as its short-term debt, and by 2003 reserves 
exceeded its total external debt. Less than ten years after the 1997–1998 East Asian crisis, 
the Republic of Korea’s IR/GDP seemed to be more than adequate using conventional 
yardsticks—exceeding the exposure to short-term debt, and allowing financing several 
quarters of imports. Yet, this blissful configuration held only for three years. While the 
Republic of Korea’s IR/GDP remained stable during 2005–2008, the overall external 
debt/GDP doubled, with the level of short-term external debt approaching the level of 
international reserves. 
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Notes: The data cover through mid-2008, before the global liquidity crunch. SED = short-term external debt, TED = 
total external debt. 
Source: Author’s calculation 
The global liquidity crisis of 2008–2009 and the ensued deleveraging illustrated vividly the 
fragility of the Republic of Korea’s balance sheet. During the first stage of the crisis (3
rd and 
4
th quarters of 2008), the Republic of Korea’s reserves dropped by about $60 billion in half a 
year, a decline of about 25%. Indeed, reserves were key to the bailout package that the 
government unveiled in the second half of 2008. The centerpiece of the package was a $100 
billion three-year government guarantee for banks’ foreign debt. This sum was more than 
sufficient to cover Korean banks’ foreign debt maturing by June 2009, estimated by the 
Ministry of Strategy and Finance to be about $80 billion.  
Yet, despite the large hoarding of international reserves used to finance the bailout package, 
market concerns were not abated. The Republic of Korea experienced a massive confidence 
crisis in the second half of 2008, which was abated only following the introduction of an 
unprecedented $30 billion US Fed’s swap line to the Republic of Korea, to be followed later 
by swaps lines from the Bank of Japan and the Bank of China. While the Fed’s swap line 
was modest relative to the Republic of Korea’s International reserves (IR), the signaling 
effect associated with the Fed’s willingness to support the Republic of Korea probably 
prevented switching to a panic equilibrium, and within a quarter the confidence crisis abated. 
Indeed, within less than a year from the crisis, another U-turn happened, and large inflows of 
capital from the US and other OECD countries resumed. These developments are also 
reflected in the exchange rate. The deleveraging crisis induced massive depreciation of won 
within less than a year, from 900 W/US$ to about 1500, while the resumption of financial 
inflows induced rapid appreciation towards 1100 W/US$. 
4. POLICY  LESSONS 
We analyze in this section possible policy lessons associated with emerging Asia’s 
experience during the crisis of 2008–2009. We conclude that prudential supervision, 
tightening the link between short-term external borrowing, and hoarding IR would mitigate 
the excessive exposure to deleveraging risks induced by short-term external borrowing. A 
key lesson from the recent history of the Republic of Korea and other emerging markets is 
the downside risk of financial openness and under-regulation of financial flows. Financial 
flows are volatile and fickle, and may be subject to herding and contagion. These flows are 
impacted by changing perceptions about the attractiveness of the emerging market country 
relative to that of the OECD countries, and to other emerging markets. Sizable flows may be 




effects. To illustrate, private banks in the Republic of Korea (domestic and foreign banks 
operating in the Republic of Korea) may opt to borrow externally to fund carry trade. This in 
turn increases the exposure of the Bank of Korea to the possibility of deeper bailout needed 
at times of deleveraging. Hoarding international reserves by the Bank of Korea may not be 
enough to protect the interest of the Republic of Korea’s taxpayers. The bailout option may 
inadvertently subsidize the carry trade, as the private bank borrowing the funds does not 
have the incentive to internalize the greater taxpayers’ exposure to the future bailout.
11 The 
same logic applies to other activities funded by private banks’ external borrowing.  
This example illustrates the need to apply the public finance approach to international 
reserves and prudential policies in emerging markets. Prior to the crisis, IR/GDP was viewed 
as a key indicator of soundness of policies. Yet, the experience of countries during the crisis 
suggests that accumulation of IR is only one dimension of prudential policies. With hazards 
impacted by agents’ behavior, optimality calls for a mixture of partial insurance and 
preventive methods reducing the frequency and intensity of the calamity (installing a fire 
alarm and external lights in a house, driving a car at a lower speed, equipping a car with air 
bags, etc.). This logic applies equally well to the emerging markets’ exposure to sudden 
stops and deleveraging shocks—a country may supplement hoarding international reserves 
with policies that would reduce its exposure to capital flight. Such policies may include 
proactive steps to reduce exposure to external debt (Rodrik 2006). Regulations reducing 
external borrowing may trim the demand for IR, increasing the overall welfare of the 
economy.  
The public finance approach to regulation is reflected in Hyun Song Shin’s view (stated while 
serving as a chief advisor to President Lee Myung-bak),  
“…it should tax the wholesale liabilities of the country’s banks. Whenever a Korean bank wants to 
expand its loan book faster than its retail deposits, it relies on foreign borrowing to fill the gap. So a 
levy on these extra liabilities would serve to limit banks’ borrowing abroad.” The Economist, 11 
November 2010.  
Taxing surges in external borrowing of domestic banks is a discretionary tool supporting 
prudential supervision (Aizenman 2011). This policy tool is akin to an international version of 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) policies in the US. A deposit in a bank 
covered by the FDIC allows the bank to expand its balance sheet, increasing the expected 
liabilities of the FDIC (i.e., the tax payer) at a rate proportionate to the riskiness of bank’s 
portfolio. The insurance offered by the FDIC implies that the saver lacks the incentive to 
monitor the bank. This distortion should be dealt with by imposing a risk premium on the 
bank, at a rate reflecting its riskiness. The main difference between FDIC’s risk premium 
applied to domestic deposits and external borrowing by banks in emerging markets is that 
the FDIC covers deposits in US dollar, and is indirectly backed by US ability to cover these 
liabilities by fiat money and/or domestic taxes. In contrast, external borrowing by EMs’ banks 
increases the balance sheet exposure of the country to foreign currency debt. This exposure 
should be dealt with by the accumulation of IR and by the proper risk premium, inducing 
banks to internalize the impact of external borrowing on the tax payers’ exposure to future 
bailouts. Ironically, economists that oppose external borrowing tax, viewing it as an 
impediment to free mobility of capital, rarely support the abolishment of deposit insurance.  
                                                  
11 An interesting observation made by Dominguez, Hashimoto, and Ito (2011): “Countries with large stocks of 
international reserves and a high domestic interest rate may inadvertently be counter-parties to the carry trade. 
While carry-traders borrow in low interest currencies and invest in high interest currencies, most reserve building 
countries invest in low interest foreign currencies and borrow at the (relatively higher) domestic interest rate.” 
This observation is consistent with the view that the optimal accumulation of reserves should be addressed as 
part of a comprehensive prudential regulation that would recognize possible externalities associated with carry 
trade exposures. 




Taking this public finance perspective, open capital markets should be supervised with 
prudential regulations aimed at limiting the adverse balance sheet exposure. This can be 
done by taxing external borrowing at a rate reflecting the risk exposure, and using the tax 
revenue to co-fund precautionary accumulation of reserves. These steps may include 
discretionary, time varying taxes and reserve ratios, adjusted to reflect the inflow pressure, 
and the balance sheet exposure of the banking system.
12 The resumption of growth of the 
emerging markets in 2010, at times when in most OECD countries growth remains anemic 
and subject to expansionary monetary policy, increased substantially the interest rates in 
emerging countries relative to that in the OECD. This in turn led to large surge in inflows of 
capital to EMs, inducing EMs to invoke prudential policies and regulations. Table 1 
summarizes some of these policies in Asia, showing the proliferation and deepening of these 
policies in the Republic of Korea and other emerging Asian countries. Similar trends apply to 
emerging Latin American countries and other regions (see Pasricha [2011] for analysis of 
the recent regulation trends in EMs). 
                                                  
12 See also Bianchi (2010) and Korinek (2010), who studied the way capital flow volatility can trigger feedback 
cycles that work through the depreciation of the real exchange rate. ADBI Working Paper 316      Aizenman 
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Table 1: Recent Macro-prudential Measures and Capital Controls in Emerging Asia in 2010 
 
Country  I/ 
O 
T/ 
E  Type Nature  Summary 
PRC I  E  CC 
Foreign investors' 
access 
Some overseas FIs allowed to invest their foreign yuan holdings in domestic interbank 
market bonds.  
India I  T  CC 
Interest Rate Caps 
on ECB  Interest rate cap on eligible external commercial borrowing re-instated.  
Indonesia   T  OM 
Minimum holding 
periods on central 
bank bills 
Minimum holding period introduced on central bank debt instruments, for both residents and 
non-residents. 
Indonesia I  T  CM  Reserve  Ratios  Foreign-currency  deposit RR increased from 1% to 5% in March. 
Indonesia I  T  CM  Reserve  Ratios  Foreign-currency deposit RR increased from 5% to 8% in June 
Indonesia I  T  CC  Reserve  Ratios
30% RR on vostro accounts (rupiah-denominated transaction accounts held by non-
residents), beginning end-January 2011 with 3-month transition.
Indonesia I  T  CC 
Ceilings on foreign 
investment/ external 
borrowings  Limit (30%) on daily balance of banks' short-term external debt re-instated. 
Rep. of Korea  I  E  CC  Withholding Tax 
Removed withholding tax of 0–15% (depending on tax treaty) on interest, capital gains tax 
and transaction tax for non-residents. 
Rep. of Korea    T  CC 
Limits to FX 
exposure/ currency 
mismatches 
Tightened limit on FX derivatives contracts of domestic banks and foreign bank branches 
with domestic residents (100% of value of exports from 125%) 
Rep. of Korea  I  T  CC 
Limits to FX 
exposure/ currency 
mismatches 
New limits set on FX derivatives contracts of domestic banks (50% of previous month’s 
capital) and branches of foreign banks (250%).  
Rep. of Korea  I  T  CM  Exchange controls  
Bank loans in foreign currency to be restricted to overseas uses only. Small and medium 
sized manufacturers exempted. 
Rep. of Korea  I  T 
CC/C
M 
Limits to FX 
exposure/ currency 
mismatches  Tighten existing regulations on foreign currency liquidity of domestic banks.  
Rep. of Korea  I  T  CC  Tax on Inflows 
14% withholding tax on interest income on bonds bought by foreign investors as well as a 
20% capital gains tax re-imposed. 
Rep. of Korea  I  T  CM  Tax on Inflows 
Announced plans to legislate a macro-prudential stability levy on non-deposit foreign 
currency liabilities. The levy will fund provision of FX liquidity when necessary.  
Philippines O  E  CC  Exchange  controls   
Allow prepayment of BSP-registered foreign/foreign currency loans of the private sector to be 




Country  I/ 
O 
T/ 
E  Type Nature  Summary 
Philippines  O  E  CC  Exchange controls   Banks allowed to process remittance requests by foreign investors without prior approval.  
Philippines  O  E  CC  Exchange controls   Increase in FX purchase limit for outward investment by residents. 
Philippines O  E  CC 
Disclosure 
Requirements 
Registration requirements for outward investments by residents in excess of US$ 60 million 
lifted and replaced by reporting requirements.  
Taipei,China I  T CM  
The rate on reserve requirements for currency deposits will be increased to 0.193% from 
0.178%, while the rate for Taipei,China dollar time deposits was lifted to 0.934% from 
0.855%. 
Taipei,China I  T CC 
Foreign investors' 
access 
Offshore funds restricted to investing no more than 30% of their portfolios into local 
government debt and money-market products. 
Taipei,China  I  T  CC  Exchange controls  Trading in NDFs capped at one fifth of a bank's total FX trading. 
Taipei,China I  T CC  URR 
Monetary authority won’t pay lenders interest from Jan. 1 on reserves held for deposits from 
foreigners. It currently pays interest on 55% of the reserves. 
Thailand O  E  CC 
Ceilings on foreign 
investment/ external 
borrowings  Raised limits on foreign asset accumulation by residents, including outward FDI. 
Thailand O  E  CC 
Ceilings on foreign 
investment/ external 
borrowings 
Removed limit on direct overseas investment, relaxed restrictions on lending by Thai firms to 
non-resident borrowers, and raised cap on offshore property purchase. 
Thailand O  E  CC 
Ceilings on foreign 
investment/ external 
borrowings 
Permitted Thai companies to invest abroad in the form of direct investment or lend to 
affiliated companies up to US$ 50 million per year. 
Thailand O  E  CC 
Ceilings on foreign 
investment/ external 
borrowings 
Relaxed other regulations for Thai residents which include: raising outstanding balance limits 
on foreign currency deposit accounts deposited with funds exchanged from commercial 
banks; increasing amount limit for purchase of immovable properties abroad; relaxing 
regulations on repatriation by raising the threshold amount above which foreign currency 
proceeds are required to be brought into Thailand, as well as relaxing the related reporting 
requirement. 
Thailand I  T  CC  Tax  on  Inflows 
Withholding tax of 15% to be imposed on interest income and capital gains receivable by non-resident 
corporate and individual investors on bonds issued by the government, state enterprises and the Bank 
of Thailand. 
Notes: ECB=external commercial borrowing; BSP=Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas; RR=reserve ratios; NDF=non-deliverable forward; FX=foreign exchange; 
I/O=Inflow/outflow; T/E=Tightening/easing; CC=capital control; CM=Currency based measure; OM=other measure. 
Source: IMF AREAER 2002–2009, Reinhart and Reinhart 2008, national sources and news articles. ADBI Working Paper 316    Aizenman 
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Remarkably, the IMF acknowledged the potential usefulness of these steps as practical 
response to varying circumstances:
13  
“From a macroprudential perspective, the relevant concern is the contribution of capital inflows to the 
buildup of systemic vulnerabilities, by facilitating the buildup of imbalances in the financial and non-
financial sector, unsustainable asset price booms, and financial sector distress as flows stop or 
reverse direction.” 
“Macroeconomic policies can be used to address the risks from large inflows. If these policies are not 
sufficient, prudential tools and in some circumstances, also capital controls can be used. Some 
prudential tools can reduce potential systemic risks associated with capital inflows without targeting 
inflows per se. These tools differ from capital controls in that they do not discriminate between 
residents and non-residents. One example is a countercyclical capital buffer linked to the buildup of 
credit, which could be triggered by a broad indicator of credit growth that captures both domestic and 
foreign provision of loans. A second example is caps on LTV and debt-to-income ratios, which would 
discourage an erosion of lending standards. In addition, a levy or charges on short-term wholesale 
funding could also potentially discourage overreliance on vulnerable wholesale funding, irrespective of 
whether that funding is sourced domestically or from abroad. 
Macroprudential tools can also be used to reduce indirectly systemic risks in the non-financial sector 
associated with capital inflows. Republic of Korea’s leverage cap on banks’ off-balance-sheet foreign 
exchange positions introduced in June 2010 aims to achieve this objective. Capital controls are 
motivated by various considerations, both macroeconomic and financial. As such, they are not 
macroprudential instruments, although they could be if they specifically targeted systemic risk and 
were underpinned by strict governance arrangements that ensured no slippage in their use.” 
4.1  Postcrisis challenges 
Earlier research suggests that EMs that increased their financial integration during the 1990s 
and mid 2000s, accumulated IRs due to several reasons, including the precautionary motive 
to obtain self insurance against sudden stops and deleveraging crises.
14 Yet, the 2008–2009 
global crisis suggests that the levels of IR required in order for this self-insurance to work 
may be comparable to that of a country’s gross external financial exposure (see Park 2009). 
The financial turbulences confronting Asia are illustrated by the patterns of net private capital 
flows, in percent of GDP, in emerging Asia (see World Economic and Financial Surveys 
Regional Economic Outlook: Asia and Pacific, IMF, April 2011). Emerging Asia excluding the 
PRC confronted a drop in private capital flows of 7% during the crisis (from about plus 3% to 
above minus 4%), bouncing back to inflow of about 4% within a year from the crisis, to the 
pre crisis level. The most volatile component in emerging Asia excluding the PRC was bank 
and other private flows, moving from 4.1% in 2008 Q1, to -1.4% in 2009 Q1, bouncing back 
to 3.4% in 2010 Q1. This is another illustration of the nature of financial openness: private 
financial flows are volatile, and subject to quick reversal. FDI seems to exhibit lower overall 
volatility, while banks and debt flow are highly volatile. Note that the overall swing of the 
flows was smaller than the one registered in the 1997–1998 crisis, but nevertheless large, 
and potentially destabilizing. While in the 1997–1998 crisis the volatility was mostly induced 
by factors specific to East Asia, the 2008–2009 crisis was propagated from the US, 
dominated initially by the deleveraging of foreign positions due to liquidity shortage induced 
by the financial panic in the US, as well as by the fear of the coming global recession. This 
time, however, the overall superior balance sheet position of emerging markets, especially of 
emerging Asia relative to that of the US and Europe, provided the impetus for the resumption 
of large inflows of capital. The solid resumption of growth of emerging Asia, in contrast to the 
anemic recovery of the US and Europe, and the instability of the eurozone propagated by 
                                                  
13 See BIS, FSB, and IMF (2011), which also states “These issues are currently being examined in detail by the 
IMF, with a view to further developing guiding principles for the use of policies to manage capital flows, both 
from the perspective of individual countries and taking into account the multilateral dimension. Macroeconomic 
policies can be used to address the risks from large inflows.” 




the shaky debt positions of its periphery countries, induced massive inflows of funds, 
possible chasing yields.  
The resumption of the inflows of capital to emerging Asia comes at times when monetary 
expansions and easy credit induced by the crisis, and the fast growth recovery set in motion 
real estate and asset appreciations. The inflow of foreign capital may provide further impetus 
for these trends. Reserve accumulations to deal with external borrowing have limited 
capacity to deal with these challenges. It comes with the need to sterilize in order to mitigate 
the inflationary bias, yet sterilization is not costless, and may lead to secondary rounds of 
inflows, possibly leading to inflationary pressures down the road (see Aizenman and Glick 
2009). Furthermore, emerging markets may participate today in another round of global 
carry trade, where the lower interest rates in the US and the OECD countries fund the 
purchase of higher yielding bonds in emerging countries. This situation exposes the global 
financial system to the potential instability associated with unwinding of carry trade positions. 
While such carry trade may provide private rents to savvy players, it exposes the taxpayers 
in emerging countries to greater future liabilities. As our previous discussion suggested, 
prudential regulations are needed to mitigate these forces. These regulations should 
supplement tighter monetary and fiscal stance, as there is no way to deal with the inflow 
pressure by prudential policy alone.  
5. CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
The crisis of 2008–2009 is a tectonic shift that hastened the dismantling of the Bretton 
Woods II system, moving from a US centric towards a multi polar world. This paper focused 
on the crisis from the perspective of emerging market countries, with a special focus on 
emerging Asia. Overall, the crisis validated the gains from the middle ground position in the 
trilemma configuration, buffered by a sizeable chest of international reserves. Yet, the crisis 
also illustrated the need to take a broader public finance approach towards prudential 
regulations. Our analysis looked at the perspective of the emerging markets, and did not 
deal with the degree to which there is greater room for an overhaul of the global financial 
system. Emerging countries have asserted their willingness to use proactive measures 
managing their financial integration.  
The recent statements from the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) may reflect a 
paradigm shift in the assessment of prudential regulation, propagated by the global crisis 
and the willingness of emerging market countries to experiment with new policies. Yet, it is 
premature to know the degree of the effectiveness of these steps, and the ultimate impact of 
the crisis on the IFIs’ and the OECD’s de facto and de jure positions regarding financial 
integration and prudential regulation. Nevertheless, the logic of the public finance approach 
suggests the following: 
i.  Evidence suggests that capital mobility is a mixed blessing. Starting with 
autarky, FDI and greater financial integration seem to support economic growth. Yet, 
excessive inflow of hot money increases the vulnerability of a country to crises. 
ii.  The 2008–2009 crisis illustrated the risk of low and uneven standards of 
prudential regulations. Chances are that the OECD countries overshot the optimal 
financial deregulation in the decade before the crisis, and the global financial globalization 
went too far.  
iii.  There is a probable rivalry between the interests of the financial sector and the 
non-financial economy. Regulations should be set at a level that probably would make 
financial intermediation less profitable, so that the social marginal cost of financial 
intermediation equals the social marginal social benefit. 
iv.  Chances are that the financial system may resist changes, as it will cut its 




bias against financial regulations: All the crises that were avoided by tighter financial 
regulations are imperceptible and not credited to the policymaker. Yet, the cost of financial 
regulation is transparent and debited to the policymaker. This asymmetry suggests that 
higher regulator effort, while helping to avoid a crisis, tends to erode over time the support 
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